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Abstract
We provide an up-to-date overview of the literature on the desirabil-
ity of central bank transparency from an economic viewpoint. Since the
move towards more transparency, a lot of research on its e⁄ects has been
carried out. First, we show how the theoretical literature has evolved, by
looking into branches inspired by Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) and by
investigating several, more recent, research strands (e.g. coordination and
learning). Then, we summarize the empirical literature which has been
growing more recently. Last, we discuss whether: -the empirical research
resolves all theoretical question marks, -how the ￿ndings of the literature
match the actual practice of central banks, and -where there is scope for
more research.
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11 Introduction
Central banks used to be very secretive, but the last two decades a lot of central
banks changed their regimes into a more transparent one.1 As central banks be-
came independent, being transparent gained importance based on accountability
arguments. An additional reason why transparency came into prominence, is its
in￿ uence on the formation of expectations. With the increased importance of
￿nancial markets, managing in￿ ation expectations has become key in monetary
policymaking (e.g. Winkler, 2002). It is important because it determines the
success of the transmission of monetary policy. There are several bene￿ts from
successfully steering market expectations, like reduced uncertainty, improved
planning of market participants, lower interest rate volatility, and more e⁄ec-
tive monetary policy (e.g. Issing, 2005). Whether transparency is bene￿cial
from an economic point of view, however, is a question with a less obvious an-
swer. Therefore, a lot of research has been conducted to ￿nd out whether the
trend towards more transparency is desirable from an economic perspective as
well. These studies vary with respect to the analyzed aspect of transparency and
their method of analysis, which makes it di¢ cult to assess the overall pattern.
In this paper we provide more insight into the transparency literature, refraining
from accountability issues. By doing so, several interesting questions will be an-
swered: 1) Does the theoretical literature come to a unanimous conclusion with
regard to the desirability of transparency? 2) If not, what causes di⁄erences in
outcomes? 3) Does the empirical literature provide answers to some potential
theoretical question marks? 4) Is there scope for further research?
This paper is not the ￿rst overview of the literature on the economic e⁄ects of
central bank transparency. These earlier surveys discuss the literature based on
di⁄erent categorizations of transparency (Geraats, 2002; Hahn, 2002; Carpenter,
2004) or views of transparency (Posen, 2003).2 Since the construction of these
overview papers, the literature on central bank transparency has further devel-
oped. Moreover, several new theoretical research strands emerged, such as the
work on coordination games, committees, and the literature on learning. Our
survey describes the chronological development of the theoretical transparency
literature, to give more insight into its development. In addition, and only
starting to evolve more recently, a lot of empirical research has been performed
which is summarized as well. To improve the insight into the desirability of more
transparency from an economic viewpoint, an up-to-date overview is needed.
We start by exploring the theoretical literature based on the seminal work of
Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), henceforth CM (1986). Three di⁄erent branches
that are (partly) based on this work are distinguished and discussed in chrono-
logical order. They di⁄er in the speci￿c aspect of transparency that is discussed:
transparency about preferences, economic transparency, or control error trans-
parency. Besides the research inspired by CM (1986), we summarize various
1Goodfriend (1986) provides a nice summary and comments on the Fed￿ s written defense
for secrecy, which it made in 1975 when it was sued to make its policy directive and minutes
public immediately after Federal Open Market Committee meetings.
2See Geraats (2006) for an overview of the practice of monetary policy transparency.
2other strands of theoretical literature. First, we look at the research based on
reserve targeting models which dates from the end of the eighties, beginning of
the nineties, starting with the paper by Dotsey (1987). More recently several
new strands of literature emerged as well. The analysis of transparency within
coordination games is a concept ￿rst introduced by Morris and Shin (2002).
The idea is that there is public as well as private information about the funda-
mentals of the economy. Agents want to match these fundamentals, but face
a coordination motive as well. Another strand of literature analyzes the e⁄ect
of transparency within monetary policy committees (e.g. Sibert, 2003). The
most recent strand of research discussed here, is the learning literature based on
Evans and Honkapohja (2001), which in contrast to the previous literature on
central banking does not assume rational expectations. After Svensson (2003)
pointed out that the e⁄ect of transparency on learning was largely neglected,
research within this ￿eld evolved. This strand of literature assumes that agents
engage in learning, for example about the central bank￿ s policy model. Un-
der the assumption of learning, managing in￿ ation expectations becomes more
important. Figure 1 summarizes the evolution of the theoretical transparency
literature.





















Figure 1: Overview of the theoretical transparency literature
The ultimate test for the desirability of transparency from an economic stand-
point is empirical research. One requirement for empirical research is to have
some measure of transparency at one￿ s disposal. At ￿rst, empirical research was
hindered by the lack of transparency data. The construction of several measures
of transparency enabled more empirical research. For example, the time-varying
Eij¢ nger and Geraats (2006) index is helpful, because besides containing infor-
mation about the relative degree of transparency of central banks, it includes
information about the timing of transparency events as well. In this paper we
focus on the papers analyzing the e⁄ects of longer lasting transparency changes,
3and abstain from work on the e⁄ects of day-to-day communication.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the theo-
retical literature. In order of appearance we discuss the ￿ndings of: CM(1986)
and the research inspired by it (2.1), the reserve targeting models (2.2), the
coordination literature (2.3), the committee models (2.4), and the learning lit-
erature (2.5). In Section 3, we move to the empirical ￿ndings. Anticipation,
synchronization, macroeconomic variable e⁄ects, and credibility, reputation, and
￿ exibility e⁄ects are analyzed in separate subsections (3.1-3.4). A brief cross-
country comparison of the results is given in 3.5. Finally, in Section 4, we will
discuss the ￿ndings, and provide some directions for further research within this
￿eld.
2 Theoretical Findings
Several arguments have been put forward both in favor of as well as against
transparency. Theoretical work formalizes these arguments with the help of
economic models. Appendix A provides an overview of the theoretical papers,
starting in 1986 with the seminal work of Cukierman and Meltzer up to now.
The papers are arranged in order of the year in which they were published,
and they are alphabetized within a year. For each paper it is clari￿ed which
aspect of transparency is treated. Geraats (2002) made a useful classi￿cation of
transparency into ￿ve di⁄erent categories:
1) Political transparency includes information provision about the central bank￿ s
goals, how they are prioritized, and quanti￿ed. In addition, it concerns explicit
institutional arrangements or the presence of a contract between the government
and the central bank.
2) Economic transparency exists when the central bank shares its knowledge
about the economy, for example by providing the economic data, and models it
uses, and the forecasts that it makes.
3) Procedural transparency concerns openness about the procedures used to
make monetary policy decisions (e.g. by being open about the strategy, and by
publishing voting records, and minutes).
4) Policy transparency is present when there is no asymmetric information re-
garding the central bank￿ s policy (decisions are clearly explained, changes are
immediately announced, and future policy paths are indicated).
5) Operational transparency is higher when the central bank regularly assesses
its performance, and when it is open about the macroeconomic disturbances
that in￿ uence the transmission process.
Besides the aspect of transparency considered in the papers, we also brie￿ y de-
scribe the model used in the papers reviewed (see the overview table in Appendix
A). Because the model choice as well as the manner in which transparency is
modeled are crucial for the outcome obtained. The importance of model choice
is illustrated by Cukierman (2002), who compares the transmission of mone-
tary policy in three di⁄erent models: 1) a Monetarist Lucas-type expectations-
augmented Phillips curve, 2) a Neo-Keynesian model with backward-looking
4pricing, and 3) a New Keynesian model with fully forward-looking prices. In
the latter two models nominal prices are sticky, and therefore the nominal in-
terest rate a⁄ects the real interest rate. In these three models monetary policy
a⁄ects in￿ ation and output levels in di⁄erent ways. In the ￿rst (Lucas-type)
model, only unanticipated monetary policy has an e⁄ect on output and in￿ a-
tion is directly related to the money supply (quantity theory of money). In
the other two models, short run output is demand determined. Independent of
the presence of surprise in￿ ation, interest rate changes can in￿ uence output by
a⁄ecting demand. The e⁄ect that the policy choice has on the in￿ ation rate
depends on its e⁄ect on the size of the output gap. In the backward-looking
Neo-Keynesian model, current policy can a⁄ect the output gap with a one pe-
riod lag, and in￿ ation with a two-year lag. In contrast, in the forward-looking
New-Keynesian model current policy can already a⁄ect the present values of
the output gap and in￿ ation by changing the expectations that currently exist
about future variables.
Finally, the last column in the theoretical overview table in Appendix A contains
a summary of the ￿ndings of each theoretical paper.
In the next sections we will discuss the various strands of literature in chrono-
logical order.
2.1 Cukierman and Meltzer (1986)
The theoretical work on the economic e⁄ects of central bank transparency,
started in the 1980s with the work of CM (1986). Based on the optimal policy
models by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983b), they
conclude that the economic desirability of transparency is ambiguous. To give
an idea of how they reach this result, we brie￿ y describe the general structure
of their model, and shortly discuss the intuition of the results that CM found
based on this model.
As is shown by eq.(1), period i￿ s actual money growth (mi) is a function of
the policymaker￿ s planned money growth (m
p
i). Control is imperfect;  i is a





i +  i (1)
The policymaker tries to solve a maximization problem. Eq.(2) is the cen-
tral bank￿ s multi-period, state dependent objective function. The central bank
chooses the rate of money growth such that this objective function, which de-
pends on both in￿ ation and output, is maximized. Ceteris paribus, lower in￿ a-
tion is preferred. In addition, central banks want to create surprise in￿ ation to
stimulate output. Variations on this maximization problem are used in other
theoretical transparency papers. In eq.(2) ￿ is the central bank￿ s discount factor,
E0 is the its expected value operator conditioned on the available information in
period 0, including a direct observation of the central bank￿ s period 0 weight at-
tached to in￿ ation surprises to stimulate output (x0). The policymaker￿ s choice
5of the money growth rate depends on its weight attached to the bene￿ts of


















The central bank knows the manner in which the public forms its expectations
about money growth and in￿ ation, up to a random shock. Therefore the central
bank knows the unanticipated rate of money growth (ei) it creates by picking
a particular money growth rate (as de￿ned in Eq.(3)). E[mi p Ii] is the public￿ s
forecast of actual money growth, given the public￿ s information set Ii. This in-
formation set includes the actual money growth up to and including the previous
period.
ei = mi ￿ E[mi p Ii] (3)
Eq.(4) describes the central bank￿ s shift parameter xi. It is more likely to be
positive than negative and the shift parameter changes in response to unantic-
ipated events. These preferences show some persistence which is a function of
a constant A (which measures the bias towards economic stimulation) and a
time-varying component pi.
xi = A + pi; A > 0 (4)
This time-varying component depends on its past value, with the strength ￿
(between 0 and 1), and on a serially uncorrelated normal variate (v) that does
not depend on the control error ( i):






The public cannot observe the weight attached to surprise in￿ ation (xi) directly.
Control errors can be used to hide shifts in preferences. Based on past observa-
tions of in￿ ation, the public then imperfectly infers xi. For more details of the
model and the derivation of the results, we refer to the CM(1986) paper. For
the aim and scope of this review it is su¢ cient to take a look at the results that
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6When there is some degree of time preference (￿<1), a higher bias of the cen-
tral bank towards economic stimulation (A) leads to higher average monetary
growth. When monetary growth control is less e⁄ective (a higher variance of
the control errors: ￿2
 ) the adjustment of expectations is slowed-down (￿, the
memory of the public, is higher). Because the public is slower in recognizing
shifts to a more expansionary policy, the detrimental e⁄ects of surprise in￿ ation
are delayed and therefore the central bank gains more from surprise in￿ ation
now at the cost of future in￿ ation.







1 ￿ ￿2 + ￿2
  (9)
From eq.(9) it follows that, when there is some degree of time preference, the
variance of the money growth, V (mi), is higher when monetary control is less
e⁄ective (￿2
  higher). This impact is both direct (actual money growth is more
variable for any planned money growth level) and indirect via ￿. ￿ is higher,
so the public is slower in ￿nding out about shifts in the objectives, and as a
result it is more attractive for the central bank to stimulate the economy more
by creating more uncertainty.
A central bank with a relatively high time preference is likely to prefer a higher
degree of ambiguity. Given the variance of the monetary control error, the lower
the discount factor ￿, the higher V (mi). In this case the costs of future expected
in￿ ation are less important in the objective function and therefore it is more
attractive to stimulate the current economy. This is possible by creating more
uncertainty (V (e)), partly resulting in higher money growth variability.
When the central bank chooses the quality of monetary control the degree of
transparency is set. More e⁄ective monetary control increases transparency,
and makes it is easier for the public to deduce the central bank￿ s objectives by
looking at past in￿ ation. As a result, in￿ ation expectations (which depend both
on the policymaker￿ s mean planned in￿ ation and the actual past observations)
become more sensitive to past policy outcomes, the public learns faster, cred-
ibility is higher and the in￿ ation bias is reduced. In addition, however, there
is a detrimental e⁄ect of more transparency. The policymaker￿ s ability to use
surprise in￿ ation to stimulate output is reduced. When this detrimental e⁄ect
is relatively strong, central banks might prefer ambiguity. It makes it easier to
use positive surprise in￿ ation when it is needed the most, and negative surprise
in￿ ation in periods in which it is relatively concerned about in￿ ation.
Several branches of literature are based on the model brie￿ y presented in the
above. In the subsequent Subsections, these branches will be discussed paying
explicit attention to their link with the CM(1986) paper.
2.1.1 Preferences
Many economists argue in favor of more political transparency because it may
improve the reputation and credibility of the central bank (e.g. King, 1997;
7Friedman, 2003; Thornton, 2003). But transparency about the objective func-
tion of the central bank may be di¢ cult to realize, and a role for output in the
objective function may confuse the public. It could make the public think that
the central bank focusses on counteracting short-run output ￿ uctuations. This
makes the time-inconsistency problem worse because of higher in￿ ation expec-
tations and the resulting higher in￿ ation (Mishkin, 2004). Several theoretical
papers analyze the desirability of preference transparency. Most of these papers
are related to CM(1986). Preference transparency concerns the relative weight
attached to the goals in the central bank￿ s objective function. In terms of the
CM-model preference transparency is transparency about the value of xi. In
addition, some papers look at transparency about the central bank￿ s targets (in
the CM-model: ei or m
p
i, but in an open economy model it could be the target
for the exchange rate). Transparency about the weights in the objective func-
tion and transparency about the targets are two of the components of political
transparency, as de￿ned by Geraats (2002).
Stein (1989) presents a reason why the central bank will not be completely
transparent about its target for the exchange rate. The idea in this open econ-
omy model is that, although transparency about objectives potentially leads to
a more swift market reaction, the market knows the central bank is tempted
to manipulate in￿ ation expectations. Therefore, it is impossible for the cen-
tral bank to be clear about its policy objectives precisely and credibly. The
solution is to make imprecise statements, that is, to only announce a range
within which the target lies. Lewis (1991) shows why secrecy of central banks
might be desirable from society￿ s point of view, as well. First, secrecy about
policy intentions (CM-model: vi is only known by the central bank and there-
fore pi and through it xi) prevents central banks from being secret in other
ways (greater monetary noise:  i), which could lead to greater costs. Second, it
might be bene￿cial when the social trade-o⁄s between policy objectives change
over time. That is, the central bank can use surprise in￿ ation when society
likes it the most. Another argument why secrecy might be desirable is, is that
it could lead to wage moderation to limit real wage uncertainty, which lowers
in￿ ation and boosts output (Słrensen, 1991). Several other papers argue in
favor of secrecy too, because their models show lower resulting in￿ ation rates
as well. Cukierman (2002), using a New Keynesian model setting, shows that
when the central bank is a ￿ exible in￿ ation targeter, intransparency about the
loss-function and the weight attached to output gap stabilization is important
to maintain credibility. Even when policymakers target the average natural
level of employment, ￿ exible in￿ ation targeting in conjunction with asymmetric
output gap objectives leads to credibility problems. The higher the ￿ exibility
of the central bank in targeting in￿ ation, the higher the in￿ ation bias. Secrecy
about preferences can prevent an increase in in￿ ation expectations, which a⁄ect
current pricing decisions. As in Słrensen (1991), Gr￿ner (2002) argues in favor
of secrecy based on lower wages, and as a consequence average in￿ ation and un-
employment. Even when the only objective is to have low in￿ ation uncertainty,
transparency might not be desirable, because under bounded rationality it may
lead to a higher variance of in￿ ation. According to Sibert (2002), secrecy about
8the preferences of central bankers leads them to in￿ ate less because they want
to signal that they are of a good type (relatively low weight on output) so as
to obtain lower in￿ ation expectations. These lower in￿ ation expectations make
the trade-o⁄ between in￿ ation and output favorable, which makes it possible
to respond stronger to shocks. One exception is the central banker that puts
the most weight on output, because his type will be revealed in the most likely
outcome and therefore in￿ ation expectations cannot be improved.
In contrast, various other papers point out that preference transparency may,
in fact, be bene￿cial for the level of in￿ ation. In the majority of these papers,
however, this bene￿t comes at the cost of ￿ exibility, which could still make
transparency undesirable from an overall welfare perspective. Transparency
could reduce the in￿ ation bias for countries with a bad in￿ ation history or
relatively little independence, as is argued by Schaling and Nolan (1998). The
bene￿t from more transparency is higher when the degree of in￿ ation aversion of
the central bank is relatively low. In Walsh (1999), in￿ ation targeting lowers the
average in￿ ation bias when the announced target is equal to the socially optimal
in￿ ation rate (which is a function of the, to the public unknown, supply shocks).
The central bank￿ s response to supply shocks would be distorted if there would
be a non-contingent explicit in￿ ation target that is equal to the expected socially
optimal rate. Instead, the central bank could set an in￿ ation target that is
based on unveri￿able internal forecasts of supply shocks and announce it before
the private sector forms its in￿ ation expectations. This announcement reveals
private information about supply shocks. The imperfectly credible in￿ ation
target that is announced by the central bank could lead to a lower in￿ ation bias
without a⁄ecting the stabilization policy. In Eij¢ nger, Hoeberichts and Schaling
(2000), transparency lowers in￿ ation as well, because wage setters perceive the
central bank as more conservative, and less uncertainty reduces the volatility
of in￿ ation. However, it increases the volatility of output in response to supply
shocks, which is harmful for society￿ s welfare. When the ￿ exibility problem
is large in relation to the credibility problem, secrecy may be desirable. This
trade-o⁄ is con￿rmed by Eij¢ nger and Hoeberichts (2002), who ￿nd improved
independence associated with more transparency.
The e⁄ects on average monetary policy responses are exactly the opposite when
Beetsma and Jensen (2003) model preference uncertainty in an analogous but
slightly di⁄erent fashion (isolating the e⁄ects of preference uncertainty on policy
uncertainty). They show that in several cases preference uncertainty may not
be bene￿cial, even when the ￿ exibility problem is assumed to be relatively large.
Other arrangements, e.g. an in￿ ation contract, target or immediately choosing
the optimal degree of conservatism are superior. Eij¢ nger et al. (2003) argue
that the main result of their earlier paper still holds; when the bene￿cial e⁄ects
on output variability outweight the undesirable e⁄ects on in￿ ation (both level
and variability), it may be desirable to have uncertainty about the preferences
of the central bank. According to Hughes Hallett and Viegi (2003) the central
bank wants to limit the amount of transparency about the relative weights in
its objective function to bene￿t from lower in￿ ation (that comes at the cost of
￿scal stability). In contrast, the private sector would bene￿t from this form of
9transparency because their decisions become better informed. The same holds
for transparency about the central bank￿ s output target. Instead, assuming rea-
sonable parameter values, reducing this form of transparency does not deliver
any strategic bene￿ts for the central bank, although it might be a substitute
for credibility. Hughes Hallett and Libich (2006) show that goal-transparency,
which is preferred over goal-independence, works as a commitment device. It
makes the policymakers more accountable for price stability by threats of pun-
ishment which lowers in￿ ation and improves credibility. Demertzis and Hughes
Hallett (2007) demonstrate that political transparency leads to a reduction of
the variability of in￿ ation and the output gap, but has no implications for their
average levels.
In summary, the theoretical research on the e⁄ects of preference transparency
does not give a unanimous answer with regard to its desirability. It is found
that the outcomes depend heavily on the model assumptions being used. An
overview of these assumptions is presented in Appendix A. In most papers only
unanticipated monetary policy has an e⁄ect on output. Additional assumptions,
for example about the importance of reputation building, the manner in which
wages are set, and the precise de￿nition of transparency, do di⁄er however, and
are responsible for di⁄erences in outcomes.
2.1.2 Economic Transparency
The desirability of economic transparency is heavily debated as well. On the
one hand, transparency about the economic model used may not be desirable
because there is no consensus on the correct model of the economy (Cukierman,
2000). When forecasts are published, the danger exists that the public attaches
too much weight to them (Issing, 1999), and when provided too often they
could undermine the central bank￿ s credibility as an in￿ ation targeter (Cukier-
man, 2000). Others argue, however, that more economic transparency may
improve the markets￿understanding of the central bank￿ s actions (e.g. Blinder
et al., 2001), and improve the forecasting quality and credibility (e.g. Mishkin,
2004). Several papers discussed below are (partly) inspired by CM (1986). They
analyze the desirability of releasing the central bank￿ s information on economic
shocks, and the model and outcomes of forecasts. Therefore, all components of
economic transparency as de￿ned by Geraats (2002) are covered.
Noisy announcements (providing a range on its forecast of the money demand
disturbance) may make the trade-o⁄ between ￿ exibility and credibility more
favorable to the extent that the noisy announcements reveal the monetary au-
thority￿ s private forecast (Gar￿nkel and Oh, 1995). By in￿ uencing expectations
the monetary authority can stabilize employment even when there is a monetary
rule. Cukierman (2000) points out that transparency about economic shocks
might lead to social ine¢ ciencies. He presents two di⁄erent models. The ￿rst
is a model with a simple stochastic Lucas-supply function. Transparency exists
when information about supply shocks is provided before in￿ ation expectations
are being formed. Then the central bank looses its information advantage and
can no longer stabilize these disturbances. The second model presented is Neo-
10Keynesian. In this model the central bank·s instrument is the nominal interest
rate that, because of in￿ ation expectations that are already formed, determines
the real interest rate. Changes in the real interest rate a⁄ect demand and de-
mand then a⁄ects in￿ ation with a one period lag. Transparency is still de￿ned
as before, but in contrast in this model monetary policy still plays a role un-
der transparency. Transparency makes in￿ ation expectations more sensitive to
policy actions and, as a result, the central bank needs to change the nominal
interest rate more often to achieve the same level of stabilization of output and
in￿ ation. Transparency is still disadvantageous if society dislikes variability of
the nominal interest rate. According to Gersbach (2003) transparency about
supply shocks that a⁄ect unemployment (e.g. through publishing forecasts and
forecasting models or through releasing minutes) is detrimental because it elim-
inates the central bank￿ s possibility to stabilize employment.
Several more recent papers, however, highlight that economic transparency may
be bene￿cial. In Chortareas et al. (2003), transparency about economic shocks
(the part of the demand shock that the central bank forecasts correctly) can
lower the sacri￿ce ratio of disin￿ ation e⁄orts. The reason is that it is easier
for the public to ￿nd out the central bank￿ s preferences. In Hoeberichts, Tes-
faselassie and Eij¢ nger (2004), when the central bank is transparent about the
manner in which it assesses the private sector￿ s in￿ ation and output gap expec-
tations, the public can forecast the errors that the central bank makes with this
assessment. In their model, transparency may improve output stabilization, and
the more so the more conservative the central bank is. However, it makes the
stabilization of the in￿ ation rate more di¢ cult because the central bank will use
the interest rate to stabilize the e⁄ect of the error on the output gap. Neverthe-
less, overall social welfare is increased. In Geraats￿ s (2005) model, transparency
about the forecasts makes the interest rate a better signaling device of the central
bank￿ s preferences. Therefore, in￿ ation expectations will react more to inter-
est rates, which indicates the reputation of the central bank. Central bankers
become more interested in building up reputation, because it is easier to do so
when the markets watch the signals more closely. As a result the in￿ ation bias
will be lower. When the central bank can choose its level of transparency itself,
it will become more likely that even when the central bank is weak, reputational
concern will make it choose to become transparent. Otherwise the market will
punish the central bank with a larger in￿ ation bias. Note that the above analysis
is based on forecasts which are based on an explicit interest rate (path) to make
sure that transparency creates bene￿cial incentive e⁄ects. In case of uncondi-
tional forecasts, the in￿ ation target is directly revealed and the in￿ ation bias is
not necessarily reduced because the behavioral incentive (reputation building)
is not present. Gersbach and Hahn (2006b) show that transparency about pri-
vate information about macroeconomic shocks can reduce the margin between
the targets announced by the central bank and future in￿ ation. Prerequisite
is that this private information is veri￿able, otherwise the central bank has an
incentive to lie.
In short, in line with preference transparency, di⁄erences in model details explain
di⁄erences in observed outcomes (see Appendix A). Furthermore, the views on
11the desirability of economic transparency are mixed, even when papers based
on the same type of model are compared. Despite the above, we observe a trend
of subsiding disagreement; more recent articles on economic transparency are
in favor of it.
2.1.3 Control Errors
Several papers analyze the economic implications of transparency about control
errors (in the CM-model:  i), and thereby build upon CM (1986). Transparency
about control errors is one aspect of operational transparency, as de￿ned by
Geraats (2002).
Faust and Svensson (2001), henceforth FS, modi￿ed the model of CM (1986) by
making the loss-function quadratic in the output gap and distinguishing between
imperfect monetary control and operational transparency, which measures the
degree to which control errors are made public. Given the level of monetary
control, and assuming secrecy about the output targets of the central bank,
operational transparency will be bene￿cial for the central bank￿ s reputation.
In￿ ation expectations of the public will be stronger linked to in￿ ation, which
makes deviations from the announced zero-in￿ ation path more costly for the
central bank. Therefore it is less likely to engage in in￿ ation surprises, which
leads to lower variability of both in￿ ation and output. When, instead, it is
assumed that there is transparency about the central bank￿ s goals, then its
actions do not a⁄ect its reputation. In￿ ation will be higher on average and
so will the variability of in￿ ation and employment. However, it is pointed out
that, in a more complete model, it could well be that this form of transparency
is bene￿cial, e.g. when the public is able to force the central bank to obtain the
public￿ s goals.
In contrast to FS (2001), FS (2002) take up the endogenous choice of trans-
parency and monetary control. Most likely there will be commitment about the
choice of transparency, whereas there will be discretion about the choice of con-
trol. Then the likely outcome is that the degree of control is maximized whereas
the choice of transparency depends on the type of central bank. If the central
bank cares enough about the future and has a relatively low in￿ ation bias, then
it will commit to minimum transparency. The public can punish this patient
central bank ex post relatively heavily for in￿ ation surprises by reducing future
reputation. Therefore, lower transparency need not lead ex ante to a similar
increase in the in￿ ation bias. In addition, when the average employment target
of the central bank is zero, then the in￿ ation bias is zero independent of the
degree of transparency. Then the costs of reducing transparency in terms of
an increased in￿ ation bias is not present. In contrast, a central bank is likely
to commit to maximum transparency when it has a history of high in￿ ation
because the bene￿ts in terms of improved monetary performance are relatively
large.
Jensen (2002) shows that, within a forward-looking model, some intermediate
degree of transparency may be optimal. Transparency about the control errors
makes it easier for the public to deduce the central bank￿ s intentions, which
12makes in￿ ation expectations, and therefore in￿ ation, more sensitive to policy
actions. As a consequence, the central bank is likely to pay more attention
to in￿ ation. Although bene￿cial for a central bank that faces a low degree of
credibility, this could be detrimental for a highly credible central bank since it
makes stabilizing output more costly in terms of in￿ ation. The optimal degree
of transparency is determined by the trade-o⁄between credibility and ￿ exibility.
If the central bank instead reveals its preferences for output directly, the full
information case, then expectations do not react to central bank￿ s actions, and
therefore the central bank would remain ￿ exible.
Sibert (2006) shows that in case of non-transparency (control errors not ob-
served) private information about the preferences (weights in the objective func-
tion) leads to lower in￿ ation and the ability to react to shocks is better. When
private information about preferences exists, an increase in the degree of trans-
parency has the bene￿cial e⁄ect of lowering equilibrium planned in￿ ation (both
level and variance) without a⁄ecting the ability to respond to shocks. When the
central bank is transparent, the public can deduce the central bank￿ s actions by
looking at realized in￿ ation. Instead, it need not be easier for the public to ￿nd
out what the central bank￿ s preferences are. Numerical simulations show that
complete transparency is always preferred.
Whether more transparency about control errors is bene￿cial or not is still open
to debate. The earlier papers within this branch of literature ￿nd a trade-o⁄
between credibility and ￿ exibility, as did CM(1986), whereas according to the
most recent paper this trade-o⁄ is non-existing, and transparency is desirable.
2.2 Reserves Targeting
Another strand of literature analyzes the implications of policy transparency
within reserve targeting models. Several economists point out that it might be
desirable if central banks were to be transparent about their policy. It could
reduce excessive speculation, and make ￿nancial markets more e¢ cient, move-
ments more predictable, and reduce volatility (as argued by e.g. Blinder 1998)
Furthermore, the e⁄ectiveness of stabilization policy could improve when the
￿nancial markets know the underlying reasons for the central bank￿ s current
policy actions and its long-run policy intentions, because market reactions to
policy will more likely reinforce these policy actions (e.g. Broaddus 2001).
The theoretical papers that focus on the e⁄ects of policy transparency date from
the late 1980s and begin 1990s, and can be seen as a separate strand in the
theoretical transparency literature. All these papers focus on (non-borrowed)
reserves targeting models (which are outdated, because nowadays almost all
central banks target inter-bank or repo-rates instead), in which the policy in-
strument is a target for the money supply. The inter-bank rate (e.g. the federal
funds rate) adjusts to ensure equilibrium between supply and demand of total
reserves in the market for bank reserves (borrowed and non-borrowed). The cen-
tral bank￿ s supply of non-borrowed reserves depends on its short-term money
target and the inter-bank rate. The central bank￿ s short-term money target is
disclosed when there is policy transparency. Furthermore, it is assumed that the
13central bank has private information about disturbances to the money market,
which makes it impossible for the public to deduce the policy target from the
inter-bank rate.
The ￿rst research in this strand of the literature is in favor of more secrecy.
Dotsey (1987) argues that secrecy about the short-term monetary target has
the desirable e⁄ect of reducing the variability of the federal funds rate, because
it will respond less to unobserved monetary target disturbances. However, the
variance of the private sector￿ s forecast errors in forecasting the federal funds
rate increases. In contrast to Dotsey (1987), Tabellini (1987) argues that se-
crecy about the short-term reserves rate could increase the volatility of the
federal funds rate. The responses of the inter-bank rate to unobserved money
market disturbances increases, because part of these disturbances is assigned to
the unknown reserve target. The variability of the reserve aggregates may be
increased by this additional volatility of the funds rate, which can even extend
to interest rates of longer maturity and to other ￿nancial aggregates through
a term structure relationship. Therefore, secrecy could make it more di¢ cult
for a central bank to achieve its monetary targets. Yet another paper argues
instead in favor of secrecy (Rudin, 1988). When some private sector agents
engage in "Fed watching", policy secrecy could increase the predictability of the
federal funds rate. Because monitoring costs to infer the reserve target decrease
in case of transparency, more people take a closer look at what the central bank
does. As a result, future interest rates respond more strongly to the unfore-
castable elements in future disturbances. The agents that are newly induced to
monitor the Fed may forecast better, but this may not hold for the forecasts
of all other agents, whether they are Fed watchers or not. The increase in the
amount of central bank watchers leads to a stronger response of the inter-bank
rate to money market disturbances. Increased volatility makes forecasting the
inter-bank rate more di¢ cult for at least some, and perhaps all, of the private
agents. Another motivation for secrecy about the current monetary aggregate
objectives is provided by Cosimano and Van Huyck (1993). Secrecy forces com-
mercial banks to solve a bivariate signal extraction problem in which the current
federal funds rate and deposit rate are used to estimate both the current reserve
target and the future reserve targets. Secrecy reduces the sensitivity of the in-
terest rate to the current level of reserves and lowers the marginal interest rate
cost of moving towards the central bank￿ s reserve target and hence lowers the
upward bias in total reserves. The central bank prefers secrecy as a consequence
of this. For reasonable parameter values secrecy is bene￿cial for the commercial
banks as well.
The reserves targeting strand in the transparency literature, does not reach
a unanimous conclusion about the desirability of policy transparency. Papers
that analyze this particular aspect of transparency within a more contempo-
rary framework, in which the central bank targets the policy rate instead of
(non-)borrowed reserves, would be a useful contribution to the transparency
literature.
142.3 Coordination
Through its e⁄ect on the formation of in￿ ation expectations, transparency in-
￿ uences economic outcomes. The manner in which agents form expectations is
therefore crucial when determining whether transparency is desirable or not. A
relatively new strand of literature that analyzes the e⁄ects of transparency is
the work based on coordination games. Morris and Shin (2002), henceforth MS
(2002), analyze the social value of public information based on a model in which
agents have public and private information about the underlying fundamentals.
In addition, they second guess the actions of other agents. The smaller the
distance between a player￿ s own action and the actions of other players, the
greater the individual reward is. But from an aggregate viewpoint this coordi-
nation does not improve welfare. Agents face a coordination motive as well as
a wish to match the fundamentals. When public information is the only source
of information, greater precision always leads to higher social welfare. Instead
when some private information is available, greater precision of public informa-
tion does not always lead to higher social welfare. When private information is
very precise, more public information is likely to lower social welfare. In this
case, the coordination motive causes agents to put more weight on the pub-
lic signal than is justi￿ed by the level of its precision. Svensson (2006) shows
that for empirically reasonable parameter values, the research performed by MS
(2002) is in favor of more transparency. As a conservative benchmark, Svensson
(2006) demonstrates that when the precision of public and private information
is the same, social welfare increases with the provision of public information.
Morris et al. (2006) indicate to agree with Svensson￿ s comment and shift the
debate to the empirical question whether the degree of precision of the public
signal is su¢ cient enough to be in favor of transparency. In another paper Mor-
ris and Shin (2005) argue that providing to much information to steer market
expectations might be harmful. It could lower the informativeness of ￿nancial
market and goods prices and therefore worsen public information (which is thus
endogenous).
Angeletos and Pavan (2004) assume that there are investment complementari-
ties, which implies that the individual gain from investment is increasing in the
total level of investment. When these complementarities are weak, no matter
what structure of information, the equilibrium is unique, and more public in-
formation (either relative or absolute precision) is desirable because it improves
coordination (although it might increase aggregate volatility). What drives this
result is the assumption that, in contrast to the MS (2002) paper, more e⁄ec-
tive coordination is socially valuable. Increased precision of private informa-
tion might reduce welfare by increasing the heterogeneity of expectations which
makes coordination more problematic. When complementarities are strong, two
equilibria, a good and a bad one, are possible. Increased transparency facilitates
more e⁄ective coordination on either one of these equilibria. The only case in
which transparency might not be a good idea, is when the market is likely to
coordinate on the bad equilibrium.
Several other papers argue in favor of transparency. The optimal degree of trans-
15parency is positive under all circumstances in Cornand en Heineman (2004). It
is usually preferable to be as precise as possible about the information provided.
Sometimes, to prevent overreaction to public information, however, it is better
to withhold this information from some agents. Pearlman (2005) too argues
that the central bank should disclose as much economic information about ag-
gregate demand shocks as possible, and without noise, because it leads to higher
welfare.
Demertzis and Hoeberichts (2005) show that, when introducing costs to infor-
mation precision into the MS (2002) framework, for reasonable parameter values
a trade-o⁄ between increasing the precision of public information and the ac-
curacy of private information exists. Increasing the degree of transparency is
not necessarily desirable in all circumstances. Demertzis and Viegi (2005) argue
that it can be bene￿cial for the central bank to provide numerical in￿ ation tar-
gets because it can be e⁄ective in coordinating expectations of the private sector
at the central bank￿ s goal. Necessary conditions are that the supply shocks that
hit the economy are not large and all other public information does not give a
clear signal of what in￿ ation is intended to be. In Lindner (2006) more trans-
parency about the way in which the central bank has assessed the strength of
the economy, does not a⁄ect public information about the assessment itself but
increases the precision of private information. Multiple equilibria are less likely,
which makes currency markets more stable.
Although, at a ￿rst glance, it seemed that the work of MS (2002) argued against
transparency, it turned out that for reasonable parameter values it actually
favored transparency. Most of the research that has built upon this work is in
favor of (at least some degree of) transparency.
2.4 Committees
A separate strand of literature models decision-making within committees to
analyze whether more procedural transparency is desirable. The publication of
minutes could be desirable because it leads to accountability, but these minutes
should preferably be non-attributed to stimulate open debate (Buiter, 1999).
On the other hand, the publication of minutes may be harmful as disagreement
within the council would become public, which could harm the central bank￿ s
credibility. In addition, it could lead to less exchange of information and view-
points, informal group meetings, and manipulation of the minutes to make them
less informative (Cukierman, 2000). The publication of individual votes makes
it possible to assess the competence of individual members (Buiter, 1999), but
may damage the collective responsibility and may come at the cost of clarity,
predictability, and coherence of the policy signaled by the committee (Issing,
1999). The e¢ ciency and quality of policymaking may decrease when individual
members worry about national and personal interests (Issing, 1999; Cukierman,
2000). Blinder et al. (2001) argue that the manner of communication depends
on the policymakers in place. With one central banker, a clear statement with
the reasoning behind the decision is enough. In case of an individualistic com-
mittee, everybody votes in its own interest, therefore it is di¢ cult to agree on
16one statement, but detailed minutes should be available as soon as possible.
When the committee is collegial, it can more easily combine immediate state-
ments and minutes. It is important that the message brought about should be
consistent.
The arguments presented above were formalized a couple of years later, when
theoretical research on procedural transparency started to develop. These the-
oretical papers model the e⁄ects of procedural transparency in models of the
committee decision-making process. Sibert (2003) models reputation building
in monetary policy committees, and shows that it is important to publish the
individual votes immediately. It raises the expected social welfare because the
incentive of junior policymakers to vote in favor of policy against in￿ ation is
increased, as it now helps building up reputation. In addition, she ￿nds that
putting more weight to senior policymakers￿votes, via increased incentives for
the junior policymakers to build up reputation, is bene￿cial for welfare (un-
der the precondition that the young policymakers sometimes vote for in￿ ation).
Gersbach and Hahn (2004) demonstrate as well that it is desirable to publish
voting records. In their model, transparency makes the selection of central
bankers with desirable preferences easier, which leads to lower social losses. It
should be noted, though, that only central bankers with preferences similar to
the public would favor more transparency.
In contrast, when one assumes monetary policy within a monetary union, trans-
parency might not be desirable. It makes it easier for national governments to
appoint central bankers who have preferences that are in line with national in-
terests, but this might not be desirable for the aggregate monetary union social
welfare. Gersbach and Hahn (2005) show that voting transparency can lead to
more weight on national, instead of supranational interests, which could make
this kind of transparency undesirable when the central bankers￿private bene-
￿ts are relatively high (such that they care more about re-appointments than
about bene￿cial policy outcomes). In Gersbach and Hahn (2006a) procedural
transparency makes it easier to reelect central bankers that are highly e¢ cient
(good in choosing the right interest rate), such that the competence level of
the central bank governing council is increased. But central bankers that are
less e¢ cient try to imitate the more e¢ cient ones, because they want to keep
their job. Their interest rate guess is very likely wrong, and therefore it is less
probable that the central bank will adopt the right interest rate policy. This
detrimental e⁄ect of transparency makes procedural transparency undesirable.
In short, the theoretical literature on the procedural transparency does not
reach one unanimous conclusion, and the way in which committees are modeled
is pivotal.
2.5 Learning
In the 1970s the rational expectations hypothesis gained popularity. More re-
cently, however, a lot of critique toward rational expectations has been formu-
lated, because it is hard to believe that every economic agent behaves rationally
and uses the same model of the economy. In reaction to this criticism, mod-
17els that include learning agents were constructed. Agents are provided with
learning algorithms which they update based on past data.3 For example, the
private sector could be learning about the model that the central bank uses
in conducting monetary policy, whereas both the central bank and the public
may have to learn about the way the economy works. When one incorporates
learning in models, managing in￿ ation expectations becomes more important
to central bankers, see e.g. Orphanides and Williams (2005a). Svensson (2003)
put forward the idea that transparency may have a large impact on learning by
the private sector to form the right expectations about the economy and in￿ a-
tion. Nevertheless, transparency was largely neglected in the learning literature
for several years, until Svensson argued that welfare is likely to be higher un-
der transparency because transparency about the state and functioning of the
economy and the working of monetary policy is likely to improve the informa-
tion available to the private sector, and through this, their decisions. After this
insight, several papers sought to ￿ll this gap in the learning literature.
According to this strand of literature, more transparency seems to be desirable.
In Eusepi (2005), transparency about the policy rule can be helpful in reducing
the uncertainty and stabilize the learning process and expectations of the pri-
vate sector. Without enough transparency, the economy might be destabilized
through expectations-driven ￿ uctuations, even when the central bank is not
subject to an in￿ ation bias. The e⁄ectiveness of monetary policy is lower and
therefore interest rate changes need to occur more often and need to be larger.
The weight that the central bank attaches to output will be higher than opti-
mal (to stabilize the expectations) and the policy rule will prescribe the wrong
type of history dependence (how current policy decisions are in￿ uenced by past
conditions). In addition, it is shown that publication of forecasts is desirable
too. When the central bank and the private sector have di⁄erent variables in
their forecasting models it enables market participants to learn about the mon-
etary policy strategy. Orphanides and Williams (2005b) ￿nd that when the
central bank reveals its in￿ ation target, it becomes easier for the public to learn
the rational expectations equilibrium and to converge to the equilibrium faster.
Cone (2005) shows mixed results. Transparency turns out to be undesirable if
and only if the private sector￿ s initial in￿ ation forecast is in a certain interval
near the equilibrium. The central bank observes the in￿ ation expectations of
the public before setting the in￿ ation rate. Over time the public will learn the
rational expectations equilibrium. Instead, when market beliefs di⁄er too much
from the rational expectations equilibrium, the central bank may be better o⁄
not basing policy on these expectations. In contrast, the central bank should
be transparent about the true model and therewith in￿ uence the private sector
beliefs directly.
Overall, the papers that analyze the e⁄ects of transparency when agents learn,
￿nd that it can be a helpful tool to improve private sector learning and thereby
the decisions that it makes. But this strand of research is still in its infancy, so
more research in this ￿eld is both necessary as well as expected.
3Evans and Honkapohja (2005).
183 Empirical Results
The development of explicit indices for central bank transparency has enabled
empirical research on theoretical speci￿cations. Several indices exist, such as
the ones developed by Fry et al. (2000), Bini-Smaghi and Gros (2001), Siklos
(2002), Chortareas et al. (2002a), and De Haan et al. (2004). But all of these
indices have the disadvantage that they are made at a given point in time, and
do not provide data about changes in the degree of transparency. Eij¢ nger and
Geraats (2006) lifted this constraint by constructing time-varying transparency
indices, which have proved to be very helpful in time-series and panel data
analysis.
Appendix B summarizes the empirical literature on the economic e⁄ects of trans-
parency. Papers are ￿rst sorted according to the year of publication, and then
within a year they are listed in alphabetical order. For each paper, it is indicated
what the research encloses: the analyzed aspect of transparency, the countries
under scrutiny, the data period considered, the index used, and the obtained
results. The next sections summarize the ￿ndings per topic.
3.1 Anticipation
One important ￿nding of the empirical literature is the improved policy antic-
ipation associated with transparency. This result is supported by the majority
of papers who analyze transparency in relation to the ability to anticipate. This
holds both for papers that look at transparency in general (Muller and Zelmer,
1999; Siklos, 2003; Coppel and Connolly, 2003; Swanson, 2004; Lange et al.,
2003), as well as for research that considers the anticipation e⁄ects of a change
in a particular aspect of transparency. In this respect, all areas of transparency
are covered. Evidence for improved predictability was found as a result of
political transparency (Haldane and Read, 2000; Clare and Courtenay, 2001;
Lildholdt and Wetherilt, 2004; Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal and Howells, 2006),
the publication of forecasts (Fujiwara, 2005), voting records (Gerlach-Kristen,
2004), and higher quality in￿ ation reports (Fracasso et al., 2003). However,
the latter could be due to better policymakers that cause both improved pre-
dictability and better quality of in￿ ation reports. Results indicate that policy
transparency was bene￿cial for the predictability of monetary policy as well
(Demiralp, 2001; Poole et al., 2002; Kohn and Sack, 2003; Poole and Rasche,
2003; Ra⁄erty and Tomljanovich, 2002). Research in this ￿eld focusses mainly
on the transparency increase of the Fed that took place in 1994. Since then,
interest rate decisions take place following a scheduled meeting of the FOMC,
and are immediately disclosed by a press statement.
Not all papers ￿nd improved anticipation e⁄ects. Reeves and Sawicki (2005)
present evidence that near term interest rate expectations are signi￿cantly af-
fected by minutes and the in￿ ation report. The timeliness with which minutes
are published seems to matter. In contrast, it is harder to ￿nd signi￿cant e⁄ects
of speeches and testimony to parliamentary committees, perhaps because these
provide information covering a larger array of topics, its e⁄ect is more subtle
19and more di¢ cult to pick up. In addition, testimonies to parliamentary are es-
pecially backward-looking and do not contain much new information. Another
￿nding is that, although transparency about di⁄erent points of views about the
economic outlook could improve anticipation of future monetary policy, this is
not the case for transparency about committee members￿disagreement about
monetary policy (Ehrman and Fratzscher, 2005). Furthermore, the reaction
of Canadian interest rates to Canadian macroeconomic news is, even after in-
creased transparency, still low in contrast to the reaction to US news, which
indicates that the understanding of which Canadian macroeconomic informa-
tion is relevant for the Bank of Canada￿ s reaction function is still not clear to
the public (Gravelle and Moessner, 2001).
3.2 Synchronization
In addition to the e⁄ects on the anticipation of monetary policy, some papers
look at the synchronization of forecasts. Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal and How-
ells (2006) show that transparency has improved consensus among forecasting
agents (measured by looking at the cross-sectional dispersion of agents￿antic-
ipation). However, further tests show that this decrease in dispersion is more
likely caused by a fall in the dispersion of in￿ ation rate forecasts. Bauer et al.
(2006) demonstrate that forecasts of the private sector about economic condi-
tions and policy decisions have become more synchronized (the idiosyncratic
errors of macroeconomic variables decreased). However, they could not ￿nd ev-
idence that the common forecast error, which drives the overall forecast errors,
has become smaller. Finally, several papers ￿nd lower interest rate volatility as-
sociated with transparency (e.g. Haldane and Read, 2000; Coppel and Connolly,
2003).
3.3 Macroeconomic Variables
Within this subsection we focus on longer-lasting e⁄ects of transparency on
macroeconomic variables. Several papers look at these longer-lasting e⁄ects.
The overall measure of transparency constructed by Fry et al. (2000) is related
to better macroeconomic outcomes (Cecchetti and Krause, 2002). Drawback
of this paper is that transparency is measured in 1998, while the data period
looked at is 1990-1997, therefore causality could run the other way. In this
respect, the use of detailed time-series data on transparency could be helpful.
Higher political transparency (about the target) has been bene￿cial for both
the level of in￿ ation (Kuttner and Posen, 1999; FatÆs et al., 2006) and its
persistence (e.g. Kuttner and Posen, 1999; Levin et al., 2004). In￿ ation expec-
tations are relatively better anchored, especially for the longer-term horizons
(Levin et al. 2004), in￿ ation expectations are lower, and in￿ ation is easier to
predict, which holds for transparency about in￿ ation reports as well (Siklos,
2003). Output volatility does not appear to be signi￿cantly a⁄ected by this
form of transparency (FatÆs et al., 2006). Empirical research ￿nds some costs
from increasing procedural transparency: the quality of discussion and debate
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(2002a) ￿nd that increased transparency about the forecasts of central banks
leads to lower average in￿ ation when the domestic nominal anchor is based on
an in￿ ation or money target but not for those countries with an exchange rate
target. In addition, there is no evidence that transparency would come along
with higher output volatility. Chortareas et al. (2002b) use the same data as
Chortareas et al. (2002a) but focus on transparency about policy decisions in
addition to transparency about forecasts. Again, they ￿nd that higher trans-
parency leads to lower average in￿ ation. Furthermore, their results portray that
transparency reduces the sacri￿ce ratio. The intuition is that when the pub-
lic is able to observe the intentions of the central bank more directly through
transparency, in￿ ation expectations move fast in reaction to policy changes by
the central bank, which reduces the costs of disin￿ ation in terms of lost output
and employment. That both forms of transparency are related to lower sacri￿ce
ratio￿ s is con￿rmed by Chortareas et al. (2003), who estimate short-run Phillips
curves to get country-speci￿c sacri￿ce ratios. Publishing detailed forecast, in-
cluding a discussion of the forecasts errors and risks, and minutes and voting
records seems to help reducing the sacri￿ce ratio. Demertzis and Hughes Hal-
lett (2007) look at correlations between the Eij¢ nger and Geraats index and
the levels and variability of in￿ ation and output, and ￿nd no signi￿cant relation
between transparency and average levels of in￿ ation, average levels of output,
and the variability of output (at a 95% con￿dence level). Instead the total index
and several aspects of transparency (the economic, alternative economic, and
operational index) are signi￿cantly correlated with lower in￿ ation variability.
3.4 Credibility, Reputation, Flexibility
Some empirical papers look into the e⁄ects of transparency on the central bank￿ s
credibility, reputation, and ￿ exibility. Transparency has the potential to im-
prove the degree to which in￿ ation expectations are anchored. This is sup-
ported by the country-speci￿c and panel data regressions in van der Cruijsen
and Demertzis (2007), who make use of detailed time-series and expectations
derived from surveys. G￿rkayanak et al. (2006) ￿nd better anchored in￿ ation
expectations accompanied with transparency as well, but they use forward rates
on nominal and in￿ ation indexed bonds to determine forward in￿ ation compen-
sation. It turns out that the latter has been sensitive to economic news in
the US (a non-in￿ ation targeter) and the UK before 1997, but this is not the
case in the UK after it became independent and in Sweden (in￿ ation targeter).
Improved anchoring of in￿ ation expectations is an indication of improved cred-
ibility. Demiralp (2001) provides some indication of improved credibility as
well.
Nominal interest rates are lower for countries with a clear in￿ ation objective
(Siklos, 2004). Geraats et al. (2006), use detailed time-series information to
analyze the e⁄ect of various transparency changes on the levels of interest rates.
Lower interest rates may be interpreted as improved reputation and ￿ exibility
of central banks. They ￿nd that many transparency increases have had a sig-
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rates), frequently by over 50 basis points, although not all increases in trans-
parency were desirable, and sometimes there was a trade-o⁄ between ￿ exibility
and reputation.
3.5 Cross-Country Comparison
Although the empirical papers cover a lot of central banks, some get more at-
tention than others (e.g. the Federal Reserve Bank of the US). In most cases,
it does not matter which country is looked at, because the majority of articles
￿nd bene￿cial outcomes. Most papers either analyze only one country or a
large group of countries in a cross-country analysis, some perform case studies
of a couple of countries. Some of the latter papers ￿nd bene￿cial e⁄ects for all
countries looked at (e.g. Haldane and Read, 2000), but not all of them. Trans-
parency about di⁄erent point of views about the economy improved anticipation
of monetary policy in the US, but no signi￿cant e⁄ect could be found for the
Bank of England and the ECB (Ehrman and Fratzscher, 2005). Reasons given
are the di⁄erences in objectives across these central banks and the ￿nding of
Romer and Romer (2000) that the Fed has better knowledge and information
about the economy than the markets have. Other examples of diverse ￿ndings
are van der Cruijsen and Demertzis (2007), who ￿nd improved anchoring after
several transparency increases in some countries of their sample. In addition,
Geraats et al. (2006) ￿nd lower interest rates in a lot of cases, but not after
all cases of increased transparency. One reason could be that the type of trans-
parency change matters, but also the particular central bank that is looked at
could be crucial. For example, the central bank￿ s initial level of transparency
and credibility could play an important role. More research is needed to analyze
whether this is indeed the case.
4 Discussion and Conclusions
The debate on the desirability of transparency is still going on. As we show
in this paper, the way in which transparency was analyzed theoretically has
changed a lot during the last two decades. The research was initiated by Cukier-
man and Meltzer (1986), who display that transparency reduces in￿ ation at the
cost of the central bank￿ s ￿ exibility, a trade-o⁄ that could make transparency
undesirable. Several branches of literature have been inspired by this research.
One of these branches looks into the e⁄ects of preference transparency. Sev-
eral papers argue that preference transparency would lead to higher in￿ ation,
whereas other researchers ￿nd, similar to CM (1986), that it would lower in-
￿ ation instead. However, even those researchers demonstrate that the accom-
panied ￿ exibility loss could still make this form of transparency unfavorable.
Although there are also papers that do not ￿nd hampered stabilization pol-
icy, which illustrates that up till now no agreement on preference transparency
has been achieved. For another branch of literature that is partly inspired by
22CM (1986) as well, but analyzes economic transparency instead, we ￿nd that
although earlier papers argue against more transparency, more recent work fa-
vors it. A similar trend is present in the branch of literature on control errors.
Di⁄erences in outcomes result from diverging model assumptions, which are
summarized in the theoretical overview table (Appendix A).
Shortly after CM (1986), another strand of literature emerged. This strand
was based on reserve targeting models, and ended in 1993, but did not reach a
unanimous conclusion on the desirability of policy transparency. However, this
literature is of little relevance for contemporary policymakers, since targeting
the policy rate instead of reserves is the current practice of almost all central
banks.
As we have presented in this survey, at the beginning of this century, three
completely new strands of literature emerged. This new theoretical work focuses
on the way in which individuals take actions. One strand analyzes the e⁄ect
of public information within coordination games. It assumes that agents have
both public and private information and face a coordination motive in addition
to a desire to match the fundamentals of the economy. Most of the work in
this area is in favor of more public information, although some papers show
circumstances in which this might not be the case.
Another strand of research analyzes decision-making within committees. The
discussion on the desirability of procedural transparency is mostly based on
accountability arguments. Theoretical work on the economic implications gives
mixed results as well. The manner in which committee members are modelled
is decisive.
The most recent strand in which the e⁄ects of central bank transparency are
analyzed, is the learning literature. The majority of the work in this ￿eld
supports more transparency because it improves learning. However, one has to
be aware of the fact that this strand of literature is still in its infancy, so more
work in this ￿eld is both needed, and expected to be carried out.
On the whole, we observe a tendency that more recent work is in favor of
transparency, with the exception of the strands that analyze procedural and
preference transparency for which results remain mixed. Nevertheless, the ul-
timate answer to whether transparency is desirable or not, is provided by the
empirical literature.
Empirical research on the economic e⁄ects of more transparency is of a more
recent origin than the theoretical work. It started in 1999 when some data
with regard to transparency changes had become available. Some years later,
it received an extra impulse when several measures of transparency were con-
structed to facilitate more research in this area. The empirical results are largely
in favor of more transparency. It is found that transparency has the potential
to improve the anticipation of future monetary policy, which makes the con-
duct of monetary policy more e¢ cient. This holds for transparency in general
but for all aspects individually as well. In addition, more transparency could
reduce interest rate volatility and make forecasts more synchronized. Better
macroeconomic outcomes and improved credibility are found for all aspects of
transparency. A large part of the literature focuses on political transparency.
23From this literature we conclude that although the theoretical results are mixed,
the empirical results clearly point in favor of more political transparency. This
is not the case for procedural transparency, which could have some detrimen-
tal side-e⁄ects, namely a lower quality of discussion and debate. For all other
aspects of transparency more transparency turned out to have desirable e⁄ects,
which is in line with more recent theoretical research.
Despite the recent growth of empirical research, there is still scope for more
empirical work. Not all combinations of aspects of transparency in relation
to possible economic e⁄ects are looked at yet. In addition, the evidence on
￿ exibility and reputation does not unanimously point into one direction. Fur-
thermore, several areas are not explored yet, for example the way in which the
initial level of credibility a⁄ects the impact of transparency increases on eco-
nomic outcomes. One area closely linked to transparency, but not included in
this survey, is communication. With the move towards more transparency, the
role of communication in managing in￿ ation expectations has become more im-
portant. It is therefore likely that more and more research will focus on central
bank communication.
Furthermore, future empirical literature should look into the robustness of the
results. It is di¢ cult to measure transparency and there are some speci￿c draw-
backs from the use of indices. For example, which components should be in-
cluded and with which weight? Future research could try to ￿nd out which
aspects matter the most and should be weighted accordingly. Papers that ab-
stain from using indices but use a before-after analysis face several downsides
as well. It is di¢ cult to refute the idea that other factors might have driven
economic changes. Another empirical problem is reverse causality, which refers
to the question which came ￿rst: the good economic performance or the trans-
parency increase? Additional research into the determinants of transparency
would be helpful.
What do we see when we contrast the ￿ndings of the transparency literature
with the actual practice of central banking? The degree of transparency of nine
major central banks in 2002 is presented in ￿gure 2 (based on Eij¢ nger and Ger-
aats, 2006). Although central banks have increased their level of transparency,
there is still some room left for further improvements. The maximum degree
of transparency (15, 3 for each of the ￿ve aspects) is not yet achieved. In line
with the theoretical and empirical ￿ndings that support political transparency
the most, we observe in practice that it is the aspect of transparency on which
central banks score the highest (on average a score of 2.6), but there is still
some room for improvements for three central banks. Economic transparency
ranks second (on average a score of 2.3), and policy transparency third (2.2 on
average). Although the literature shows that both forms of transparency seem
to be desirable, only the Reserve Bank of New Zealand achieves the maximum
score on both. About procedural transparency the literature has not been deci-
sive. This might explain why in practice the score on procedural transparency
is relatively low (the average score is 1,9). But central banks score the lowest on
operational transparency (1,8 on average). Only the Swedish Riksbank scores
the maximum of 3. This can be explained by the fact that the theoretical lit-
24erature is not decisively in favor of more operational transparency. In addition,
although the empirical literature is in favor of it, relatively little empirical re-
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Figure 2: Actual degree of transparency (measured in 2002)
Coming back to the questions that we raised in the introduction of this sur-
vey and thereby brie￿ y summarizing our ￿ndings: 1) The theoretical literature
does not come to a unanimous conclusion. Although the more recent theoretical
literature argues in favor of more transparency, exceptions are procedural and
political transparency. 2) Di⁄erences in outcomes occur because of di⁄erences in
the models used. There is a tendency of more recent, micro-directed research to
favor transparency. 3) The empirical literature shows that more transparency is
indeed desirable. The only remaining question mark is procedural transparency.
4) There is still scope for some more research on transparency. But now that
most central banks have already become more transparent, it is likely that the
research will shift more towards communication, a trend that is already observ-
able. As Winkler (2002) pointed out, the release of asymmetric information is
not enough: communication should provide clarity to make sure that the re-
lease of information leads to common understanding between the public and
the central bank.
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w
e
r
i
n
￿
a
t
i
o
n
e
x
p
e
c
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
,
i
m
p
r
o
v
e
d
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
o
f
i
n
￿
a
t
i
o
n
)
t
o
t
a
l
C
A
,
U
K
1
9
9
4
-
2
0
0
1
,
1
9
9
7
-
2
0
0
1
-
d
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e
(
d
e
c
r
e
a
s
e
d
m
a
r
k
e
t
v
o
l
a
t
i
l
i
t
y
a
n
d
u
n
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
t
y
)
M
e
a
d
e
a
n
d
S
t
a
s
a
v
a
g
e
(
2
0
0
4
)
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
a
l
U
S
1
9
8
9
-
9
7
-
u
n
d
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e
(
d
e
c
r
e
a
s
e
d
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
o
f
t
h
e
F
O
M
C
·
s
d
i
s
c
u
s
s
i
o
n
a
n
d
d
e
b
a
t
e
)
S
i
k
l
o
s
(
2
0
0
4
)
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
2
0
O
E
C
D
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
1
9
6
7
-
9
9
-
d
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e
(
s
i
g
n
.
l
o
w
e
r
n
o
m
i
n
a
l
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
r
a
t
e
s
)
T
o
m
l
j
a
n
o
v
i
c
h
(
2
0
0
4
)
t
o
t
a
l
A
U
,
C
A
,
D
E
,
J
P
,
N
Z
,
U
K
,
U
S
1
9
9
0
-
2
0
0
3
-
d
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e
(
s
l
i
g
h
t
l
y
l
a
r
g
e
r
r
e
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
s
i
n
v
o
l
a
t
i
l
i
t
y
a
n
d
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
d
e
¢
c
i
e
n
c
y
o
f
￿
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
m
a
r
k
e
t
s
)
S
w
a
n
s
o
n
(
2
0
0
4
)
t
o
t
a
l
U
S
1
9
8
5
-
2
0
0
3
-
d
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e
(
i
m
p
r
o
v
e
d
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
o
f
m
o
n
e
t
a
r
y
p
o
l
i
c
y
)
D
e
m
e
r
t
z
i
s
a
n
d
H
u
g
h
e
s
H
a
l
-
l
e
t
t
(
2
0
0
5
)
a
l
l
a
s
p
e
c
t
s
A
U
,
C
A
,
E
U
,
J
P
,
N
Z
,
S
E
,
C
H
,
U
K
,
U
S
e
a
r
l
y
9
0
s
-
e
n
d
2
0
0
1
E
G
d
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e
(
n
o
t
s
i
g
n
i
￿
c
a
n
t
l
y
c
o
r
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
w
i
t
h
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
l
e
v
e
l
s
o
f
i
n
￿
a
-
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
o
u
t
p
u
t
,
a
n
d
v
a
r
i
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
o
f
o
u
t
p
u
t
,
b
u
t
t
o
t
a
l
,
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
,
a
n
d
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
t
r
a
n
s
p
a
r
e
n
c
y
a
r
e
s
i
g
n
i
￿
c
a
n
t
l
y
c
o
r
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
w
i
t
h
l
o
w
e
r
i
n
￿
a
t
i
o
n
v
a
r
i
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
,
9
5
%
c
o
n
￿
d
e
n
c
e
l
e
v
e
l
)
E
h
r
m
a
n
a
n
d
F
r
a
t
z
s
c
h
e
r
(
2
0
0
5
)
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
a
l
U
K
,
U
S
,
E
U
1
9
9
9
-
2
0
0
4
-
d
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e
(
t
r
a
n
s
p
a
r
e
n
c
y
a
b
o
u
t
d
i
⁄
e
r
e
n
t
p
o
i
n
t
s
o
f
v
i
e
w
s
a
b
o
u
t
t
h
e
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
o
u
t
l
o
o
k
i
m
p
r
o
v
e
s
a
n
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
m
o
n
e
t
a
r
y
p
o
l
i
c
y
,
o
n
l
y
f
o
r
t
h
e
U
S
)
a
n
d
u
n
d
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e
(
t
r
a
n
s
p
a
r
e
n
c
y
a
b
o
u
t
d
i
s
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
a
b
o
u
t
m
o
n
e
t
a
r
y
p
o
l
i
c
y
c
o
u
l
d
w
o
r
s
e
n
i
t
)A
u
t
h
o
r
(
s
)
A
s
p
e
c
t
(
s
)
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
(
i
e
s
)
P
e
r
i
o
d
(
s
)
I
n
d
e
x
C
o
n
c
l
u
s
i
o
n
(
s
)
F
u
j
i
w
a
r
a
(
2
0
0
5
)
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
J
P
(
4
1
f
o
r
e
c
a
s
t
i
n
g
i
n
-
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
s
)
1
9
9
8
-
2
0
0
3
-
d
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e
(
l
e
s
s
u
n
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
t
y
,
i
m
p
r
o
v
e
d
u
n
d
e
r
s
t
a
n
d
i
n
g
o
f
f
u
-
t
u
r
e
m
o
n
e
t
a
r
y
p
o
l
i
c
y
)
R
e
e
v
e
s
a
n
d
S
a
w
i
c
k
i
(
2
0
0
5
)
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
a
l
,
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
/
o
p
e
r
-
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
,
p
o
l
i
c
y
U
K
1
9
9
7
-
2
0
0
4
-
d
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e
(
M
i
n
u
t
e
s
a
n
d
t
h
e
i
n
￿
a
t
i
o
n
r
e
p
o
r
t
h
a
v
e
a
s
i
g
-
n
i
￿
c
a
n
t
e
⁄
e
c
t
o
n
n
e
a
r
t
e
r
m
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
r
a
t
e
e
x
p
e
c
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
,
t
h
e
t
i
m
e
l
i
n
e
s
s
w
i
t
h
w
h
i
c
h
t
h
e
m
i
n
u
t
e
s
a
r
e
b
e
i
n
g
p
u
b
-
l
i
s
h
e
d
s
e
e
m
s
t
o
m
a
t
t
e
r
.
I
t
i
s
h
a
r
d
e
r
t
o
￿
n
d
s
i
g
n
i
￿
c
a
n
t
e
⁄
e
c
t
s
o
f
s
p
e
e
c
h
e
s
a
n
d
t
e
s
t
i
m
o
n
y
t
o
p
a
r
l
i
a
m
e
n
t
a
r
y
c
o
m
-
m
i
t
t
e
e
s
,
p
e
r
h
a
p
s
b
e
c
a
u
s
e
t
h
e
s
e
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
c
o
v
-
e
r
i
n
g
a
l
a
r
g
e
r
a
r
r
a
y
,
i
t
s
e
⁄
e
c
t
i
s
m
o
r
e
s
u
b
t
l
e
a
n
d
m
o
r
e
d
i
¢
c
u
l
t
t
o
p
i
c
k
u
p
.
)
B
a
u
e
r
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
6
)
p
o
l
i
c
y
U
S
1
9
8
6
-
2
0
0
4
-
d
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e
(
m
o
r
e
s
y
n
c
h
r
o
n
i
z
e
d
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
s
e
c
t
o
r
f
o
r
e
c
a
s
t
s
a
b
o
u
t
t
h
e
e
c
o
n
o
m
y
a
n
d
p
o
l
i
c
y
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
s
,
b
u
t
c
o
m
m
o
n
f
o
r
e
c
a
s
t
e
r
r
o
r
u
n
c
h
a
n
g
e
d
)
B
i
e
f
a
n
g
-
F
r
i
s
a
n
c
h
o
M
a
r
i
s
c
a
l
a
n
d
H
o
w
e
l
l
s
(
2
0
0
6
)
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
,
p
r
o
c
e
-
d
u
r
a
l
U
K
1
9
8
4
-
2
0
0
3
-
d
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e
(
i
m
p
r
o
v
e
d
p
o
l
i
c
y
a
n
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
i
o
n
a
f
t
e
r
1
9
9
2
(
i
n
-
￿
a
t
i
o
n
t
a
r
g
e
t
i
n
g
)
,
a
n
d
m
o
r
e
c
o
n
s
e
n
s
u
s
a
m
o
n
g
f
o
r
e
c
a
s
t
e
r
s
a
f
t
e
r
1
9
9
7
(
i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
+
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
a
l
t
r
a
n
s
p
a
r
e
n
c
y
)
,
a
l
-
t
h
o
u
g
h
t
h
i
s
i
s
m
o
r
e
l
i
k
e
l
y
c
a
u
s
e
d
b
y
a
f
a
l
l
i
n
t
h
e
d
i
s
p
e
r
-
s
i
o
n
o
f
i
n
￿
a
t
i
o
n
r
a
t
e
f
o
r
e
c
a
s
t
s
)
v
a
n
d
e
r
C
r
u
i
j
s
e
n
a
n
d
D
e
-
m
e
r
t
z
i
s
(
2
0
0
7
)
a
l
l
A
U
,
C
A
,
E
U
,
J
P
,
N
Z
,
S
E
,
C
H
,
U
K
,
U
S
1
9
8
9
-
2
0
0
4
E
G
,
B
S
G
,
S
,
a
n
d
D
d
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e
(
b
e
t
t
e
r
a
n
c
h
o
r
e
d
i
n
￿
a
t
i
o
n
e
x
p
e
c
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
a
n
d
l
e
s
s
i
n
￿
a
t
i
o
n
p
e
r
s
i
s
t
e
n
c
e
)
F
a
t
Æ
s
,
M
i
h
o
v
a
n
d
R
o
s
e
(
2
0
0
6
)
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
4
2
1
9
6
0
-
2
0
0
0
-
d
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e
(
l
o
w
e
r
i
n
￿
a
t
i
o
n
r
a
t
e
s
,
o
u
t
p
u
t
v
o
l
a
t
i
l
i
t
y
n
o
t
s
i
g
-
n
i
￿
c
a
n
t
l
y
a
⁄
e
c
t
e
d
)
G
e
r
a
a
t
s
,
E
i
j
¢
n
g
e
r
,
a
n
d
v
a
n
d
e
r
C
r
u
i
j
s
e
n
(
2
0
0
6
)
a
l
l
A
U
,
E
U
,
J
P
,
N
Z
,
S
E
,
C
H
,
U
K
,
U
S
1
9
9
3
-
2
0
0
2
E
G
m
o
s
t
o
f
t
h
e
t
i
m
e
s
d
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e
(
l
o
w
e
r
p
o
l
i
c
y
,
s
h
o
r
t
a
n
d
l
o
n
g
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
r
a
t
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
i
n
g
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
i
n
g
￿
e
x
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
a
n
d
r
e
p
u
t
a
-
t
i
o
n
)
,
a
l
t
h
o
u
g
h
s
e
v
e
r
a
l
t
i
m
e
s
n
o
e
⁄
e
c
t
,
d
e
t
r
i
m
e
n
t
a
l
,
o
r
a
t
r
a
d
e
-
o
⁄
G
￿
r
k
a
y
a
n
a
k
(
2
0
0
6
)
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
U
S
,
U
K
,
S
E
1
9
9
4
-
2
0
0
5
,
1
9
9
3
-
2
0
0
5
,
1
9
9
6
-
2
0
0
5
-
d
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e
(
b
e
t
t
e
r
a
n
c
h
o
r
e
d
i
n
￿
a
t
i
o
n
e
x
p
e
c
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
)
S
w
a
n
k
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
6
)
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
a
l
U
S
1
9
8
9
-
9
7
-
u
n
d
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e
(
m
o
v
e
o
f
s
o
m
e
d
e
l
i
b
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
s
t
o
p
r
e
-
m
e
e
t
i
n
g
s
)
N
o
t
e
:
C
o
l
u
m
n
2
:
a
s
p
e
c
t
s
o
f
t
r
a
n
s
p
a
r
e
n
c
y
b
a
s
e
d
o
n
G
e
r
a
a
t
s
(
2
0
0
2
)
.
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
t
r
a
n
s
p
a
r
e
n
c
y
=
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
a
b
o
u
t
t
h
e
c
b
·
s
g
o
a
l
s
,
h
o
w
t
h
e
y
a
r
e
p
r
i
-
o
r
i
t
i
z
e
d
,
a
n
d
q
u
a
n
t
i
￿
e
d
,
a
n
d
e
x
p
l
i
c
i
t
i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
a
l
a
r
r
a
n
g
e
m
e
n
t
s
o
r
a
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
w
i
t
h
t
h
e
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
.
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
t
r
a
n
s
p
a
r
e
n
c
y
=
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
a
b
o
u
t
e
c
o
n
o
m
y
f
o
r
e
x
a
m
p
l
e
b
y
p
r
o
v
i
d
i
n
g
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
d
a
t
a
,
t
h
e
m
o
d
e
l
s
u
s
e
d
,
a
n
d
t
h
e
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
f
o
r
e
c
a
s
t
m
a
d
e
.
P
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
a
l
t
r
a
n
s
p
a
r
e
n
c
y
=
o
p
e
n
n
e
s
s
a
b
o
u
t
t
h
e
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
s
u
s
e
d
w
i
t
h
i
n
t
h
e
c
e
n
t
r
a
l
b
a
n
k
t
o
m
a
k
e
a
m
o
n
e
t
a
r
y
p
o
l
i
c
y
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
(
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
y
,
v
o
t
i
n
g
r
e
c
o
r
d
,
m
i
n
u
t
e
s
)
.
P
o
l
i
c
y
t
r
a
n
s
p
a
r
e
n
c
y
=
t
h
e
a
b
s
e
n
c
e
o
f
a
s
y
m
m
e
t
r
i
c
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
r
e
g
a
r
d
i
n
g
t
h
e
p
o
l
i
c
y
o
f
t
h
e
c
e
n
t
r
a
l
b
a
n
k
(
p
o
l
i
c
y
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
s
a
r
e
c
l
e
a
r
l
y
e
x
p
l
a
i
n
e
d
,
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
a
r
e
i
m
m
e
d
i
a
t
e
l
y
a
n
n
o
u
n
c
e
d
,
a
n
d
f
u
t
u
r
e
p
o
l
i
c
y
p
a
t
h
s
a
r
e
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
d
)
.
O
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
t
r
a
n
s
p
a
r
e
n
c
y
=
w
h
e
n
t
h
e
r
e
i
s
a
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
a
s
s
e
s
s
m
e
n
t
o
f
h
o
w
w
e
l
l
t
h
e
c
e
n
t
r
a
l
b
a
n
k
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
e
d
b
y
l
o
o
k
i
n
g
a
t
t
h
e
a
c
h
i
e
v
e
m
e
n
t
o
f
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
n
g
t
a
r
g
e
t
s
,
p
o
l
i
c
y
o
u
t
c
o
m
e
s
,
a
n
d
w
h
e
n
t
h
e
c
e
n
t
r
a
l
b
a
n
k
i
s
o
p
e
n
a
b
o
u
t
t
h
e
m
a
c
r
o
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
d
i
s
t
u
r
b
a
n
c
e
s
t
h
a
t
i
n
￿
u
e
n
c
e
t
h
e
p
o
l
i
c
y
t
r
a
n
s
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
.
C
o
l
u
m
5
:
E
G
=
E
i
j
¢
n
g
e
r
a
n
d
G
e
r
a
a
t
s
(
2
0
0
6
)
,
B
S
G
=
B
i
n
i
-
S
m
a
g
h
i
a
n
d
G
r
o
s
(
2
0
0
1
)
,
S
=
S
i
k
l
o
s
(
2
0
0
2
)
a
n
d
D
=
D
e
H
a
a
n
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
4
)
,
F
=
F
r
y
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
0
)
.
I
T
=
i
n
￿
a
t
i
o
n
t
a
r
g
e
t
i
n
g
,
c
b
t
=
c
e
n
t
r
a
l
b
a
n
k
t
r
a
n
s
p
a
r
e
n
c
y
.